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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a mixed duopoly model in which the public company aims to
maximize a weighted function of profits and a function of its production scale. We found
that if the weight to the scale of production is high the public firms may exclude its rivals
from the market (exercising predatory prices). We also find that the profit sacrifice by the
public firm to get this exclusion is higher if there are marked differences between the cost
efficiency of private and public firms.
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1 Introduction
To date, compelling predatory pricing theories study markets in which the firms involved are
profit maximizers. According to Fumagalli et. to the. (2018) to consider a predatory pricing
theory as convincing, this behavior must be profitable and at the same time rational, that is,
predation must be the most profitable strategy among the different alternatives available to
the incumbent company.
In many liberalized markets and under competition the incumbent company is a public
company. Likewise, although the maximization assumption is reasonable when studying the
interaction of private companies, there are theoretical arguments and empirical evidence that
*Universitat de Barcelona, jrborrell@ub.edu
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indicates that the final objectives of public companies may be different from profit maximiza-
tion.
However, despite these observations, to date no particular predatory pricing model has been
devised for the case where the incumbent company is a public company. This paper aims to
contribute filling this gap in the literature.
This research is of special interest in the current context, in which due to the powerful
effects of the COVID 19 pandemic, state aid is being revalued as an instrument of economic
policy. In many of the markets in which public companies are the incumbents, they are also
in charge of the provision of universal public service obligations and receive large amounts of
state aid. In this study we want to contribute to understanding whether state aid to incumbent
public companies can have adverse effects on competition.
The mixed oligopoly literature have analyzed theoretically the strategic interaction between
public and private firms in non-perfect competitive markets(Harris et al 1980;. Cremer et. al.,
1989).
The mixed oligopoly literature has proposed models in which public companies compete
with private companies. In several cases the difference between both types of company is the
objective function that they must maximize. Generally, in these models, private companies
behave as profit maximizers, while public or mixed companies consider social welfare as their
objective function.
Several authors of these types of models have concluded that full privatization is not recom-
mendable because it can have counter-competitive effects in the market. Many of the conclu-
sions drawn from these models assume that the objective function of public and mixed firms is
different from the private ones. In most cases, the mixed oligopoly models assume that private
firms aim maximizing profits while the objective function of public (or mixed) firms consider
the social welfare.
In this type of models, under the assumption of equal productive efficiency of public and
private firms, the impact of privatization on welfare is driven by its effect on the intensity of
competition. Traditional approaches to public firms have mainly viewed them as instruments
of government policy and planning (Bös, 2015). Following this approach, the mixed oligopoly
models assumes that the objective functions of public firms is to promote social welfare.
However, public firms may have different objectives to profit maximization and even may
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have multipilicity of objectives (Kay and Thompson, 1986). Traditional approaches to public
firms have mainly viewed them as instruments of government policy and planning (Bos, 1994).
Following this approach, the mixed oligopoly models assumes that the objective functions of
public firms is to promote social welfare. However, in the field, the objective function of this
type of firms depends of several issues related with the final objective of the government and
the incentives provided to their managers (Fershtman and Judd, 1987).
Hence, the literature of mixed oligopoly takes a somewhat naive view of the incentives
for public enterprises. For instance, if there are political pressure from voters to decrease
prices, SOEs may try to mitigate market power, even applying predatory prices. Conversely,
if a government wants to solve a problem of fiscal deficit, its SOEs may try to maximizing
profits using market power marks up as covered taxes. Likewise, governments committed with
a privatization program, they will boost the profit performance of the public firm in order to
increase the sale price. In addition, in the particular of mixed firms a government majority
share, the board members have a fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders and therefore they
cannot ignore profit-maximization incentives. According to Thompson and Kay (1986) “Public
sector managers could be expected to respond to the particular personal incentives with which
they were faced. Such incentives might lead to a desire to maximise the scale of operations of
the business, subject to any external financial constraint, or to seek a quiet life untroubled by
changes in working practices or difficulties in labour relations, rather than to pursue a nebulous
public good.”
In this paper, we propose a model in which the public company aims to maximize its size in
order to increase the bureaucratic apparatus and enhance its clientelism (in political terms) of
the company. We adopt two alternatives in order to model the problem of the public company.
In the first approach the objective function of the burocratic public firm is a linear combination
of the total sales and the benefits of the firm. In the second alternative we model the objective
function of the burocratic public firm as a linear combination of the total productio and the
benefits of the firm.
We found that if the weight to the burocratic objective is high the public firms excludes
its rivals from the market (exercising predatory prices). This result is interesting because,
pose a predatory situation in which it is not necessary a recovery phase. In this context, the
recovery phase is not necessary for two reasons: i) The public company receives state aid that
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compensates it for its losses and ii) The public company does not seek to maximize profits,
therefore it does not care to recover the losses.
The rest of this paper is divided into four sections. The second frames our contribution
in the literature of mixed oligopoly and presents evidence that supports the adoption of an
objective function that weights the scale of production. Section three presents the model,
characterizes the market equilibria and presents the conditions for predatory prices. The final
section summarizes the results and concludes.
2 Literature review
This paper lies at the intersection of two branches of the theory of industrial organization: i)
the literature of mixed oligopoly, interested in the study of the interaction in the same relevant
market of public and private firms, and ii) the theoretical models of predation.
The mixed oligopoly literature studies the strategic interaction of public and private com-
panies that compete in the same relevant market. The seminal papers of this group of studies
has focused on the optimal level of privatization (De Fraja, et al., 1989; Fershtman, 1990;
Matsumura, 1998). Other authors, as Harris et al., 1980; Beato et al., 1984; Cremer et al,
1989; Brandao et al, 2007; Bel et al, 2009 study the role of public companies as an instrument
of economic policy. For instance, Bel et. al. (2009) analyses how the size of the universal
service obligations (USO) and the mechanisms traditionally used to finance it have prevented
privatization in the postal sector. Finally, a third group of studies uses the mixed oligopoly
framework for analyzing the incentive compatibility between corporate managers and objec-
tives in both private and public companies (Freshtman et al., 1987; Barros, 1995). All these
studies assumes a public interest vision of the objective function of private firms.
Few mixed oligopoly models have explored objective functions that incorporates the ele-
ments of the point of view of the private interest and public choice theories of the economic
regulation. Nett (1994) studied the technology decision by public and private firms in a mixed
duopoly framework. He found that a private firm has an incentive to operate at lower vari-
able costs but higher fixed costs than a public firm. He assumes that a public firm maximizes
output while facing a zero-budget constraint. The author justify this assumption presenting
the arguments posed in Rees (1984). This author argues that for several reasons the manager
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of a public firm has the possibility to pursue his own objective and given this alternative, the
manager typically is interested in status, prestige, number of employees etc. These objectives
are highly correlated with output. Sappington and Sidak (2003) focus their theoretical analysis
on the setting where the public enterprise seeks both profit and expanded scale of operations.
These authors found that a reduced focus on profit may generate stronger incentives to pursue
anticompetitive activities, such as prices below marginal cost and erecting entry barriers, than
does a private profit-maximizing firm. White (2002) demonstrates in a mixed oligopoly frame-
work how a government can maximize its true objective by assigning a public firm a different
one, which can be used to disguise an unpopular political agenda or outside influence on the
regulatory body.
Regarding the formal approach, the typical model of mixed oligopoly poses that the prob-
lem of the public company is the maximization of an objective function that is the linear
combination of social welfare and the benefits of the public firm (Matsumura, 1998; Lee et.al,
2003; Claude et.al, 2005 ):
V = (1 − θ)W + θπ0
Where V is the objective function, W is social welfare,π0 is the profits of the public company
and θ is a function of private shareholding in the public firm. On the contrary the studies of
Nett(1994) and Sappington and Sidak (2003) discard the inclusion of the welfare in the objective
function and instead they weight a function of the production scale. We adopt this type of
approach. The assumption of this type of behavior by public firms is justified by theoretical
and empirical studies.
From the theoretical perspective, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) studied the behavior of private
and public enterprises in situations where politicians try to influence firms to pursue political
objectives. They argue that public enterprises are highly inefficient, and their inefficiency is
the result of political pressures from the politicians who control them. They put emphasis in
the excess of employment of public firms and point out that the beneficiaries of the excess em-
ployment are often political supporters of the government, who value these jobs because they
pay more than market wages. In their model, to persuade the manager of the public firm to
increase the extra employment, the politician subsidize the firm. Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny
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(1996) claim that public firms are highly inefficient, primarily because they pursue strategies,
such as excess employment, that satisfy the political objectives of the officeholders. They also
argue that privatization contributes to reducing these inefficiencies because the payments to
private firms necessary to incentive them to maintain inefficient levels of labor and contracting
are not politically sustainable in comparison to the alternative economic policy tool such as
subsidies for public firms. Sappington and Sidak (2004) argue that often public firms may act
more aggressively toward their competitors than would private firms. They suggest that po-
tential conducts to disadvantage competitors include setting prices below cost, misstating costs
and choosing inefficient technologies to circumvent restrictions on below-cost pricing, raising
the operating costs of existing rivals, and erecting entry barriers to preclude the operation of
new competitors. These authors also point out that the directives given to public firms to
increase local employment and/or to ensure that affordable service is provided ubiquitously to
low income families, provokes that the public firm act as if they value the expanded scale of
production. Also, these authors argue that even though SOEs may value the profit, they also
pursue anticompetitive activities that expand its own output and revenue.
There are empirical evidence that points out that public firms may have interest in consid-
ering in its objective function the scale of production. Bhaskar and Khan (1995) studied the
effects of privatization upon employment and output in the Jute industry in Bangladesh. They
found that the employment reduction after privatization was substantially larger among white
collar employees as compared with permanent manual workers. They interpret this result as
evidence that public owned firms’ employment of white-collar workers was excessive. They sug-
gest that this indicative of the clientelism incentives of public sector in Bangladesh. Colonelli,
Teso and Prem (2020) study the use of public sector jobs to reward the supporters of the party
in power in Brazilian local governments. They find a direct relation between being supporter
of the party in power and the probability of having a public sector job. Quaresma and Foirillo
(2016) investigates the influence of politician upon the managerial boards in Italian state-owned
enterprises. They found evidence that the appointment of ex members of the parliament in
the board of state owned firms is used by political parties as a reward for their loyalty during
the legislature. Majumdar (1999) evaluated and compared the returns to scale efficiency of
state-owned, private and foreign-owned enterprises in India. He found that State-owned units
suffer from decreasing returns to scale.
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Given the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence presented above, we interpret that a
simple alternative to model the behavior of a public firm with burocratic objectives is include
a weigth of the production of scale. The next section develops the implication of this new
modeling approach.
This paper is also related with the theoretical literature of predation. According to Funagalli
et. al. (2018) Predatory pricing refers to a practice whereby an incumbent firm (the predator)
sets prices very aggressively, sacrifying its profits, with the objective of excluding a rival from
the market and subsequently obtaining higher profits in the future through the exercise of
market power. Hence the predation theory recognise two stages in this phenomenon: the
sacrifice period and the recoupment period.
During a long there was a lack of a convincing theory of predatory prices. For being con-
vencing a predation theory has to prove that this behavior is profitable and rational. According
to Funmagalli et. al. (2018) for predation to be rational, it must be not only feasible but also
more profitable than alternative instruments.
It is important to note that until date the theorists of the predation phenomenon only
have considered as rational the profit maximization behavior, and that it is why predation
must be the most profitable strategy. Under this rationality concept the theorist of predation
have resorted to asymmetric information problems in order to provide a convincing theory of
predation.
Kreps and Wilson (1982) propose a theory of entry deterrence based on the reputation of
aggressive competitor of the incumbent in a repeated game context. This theory is built on the
information constraints of the potential entrant regarding the aggressiveness of a multi-market
monopolist. Given this uncertainty, the latter pretends to be a very tough competitor in order
to create a reputation in early stages of the game and keep its monopolist position in several
markets in subsequent stages.
Also in the context of repeated game interaction, Milgrom and Roberts (1982) propose a
signalling model of rational predation in which the incumbent mimic the behavior of a low cost
firm. As in the Kreps and Wilson (1982) model, the incumbent exploits the limited information
of the rivals. Given the uncertainty of the prey about the cost of the incumbent, the latter
pretends to be very competitive in order to discourage the permanence of the rival in the
market and to prevent further entry into the market in the future.
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In a different line from the reputational models, Scharfstein (1984) and Fundenberg and
Tirole (1986) propose models of rational predation, in which the objective of the predatory
behavior of the incumbent is to sabotage the acquisition of information by the prey from its
participation in the market. In a different way to reputational models, the predatory behavior
of the incumbent aims to prevent the incoming rival from obtaining information that allows it
to infer the true profitability of the market.
Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) proposed a theory of predation based on agency problems in
financial contracting. This theory is built on the limited information of the external funding
providers regarding the long run profitability of the prey. This theory considers the access to
external funding as endogenous, and suggest that the mechanism used by the incumbent for the
exclusion of the rival of the market consist in the reduction of profitability of the latter in early
stages of its activity in the market. This reduction affects the perceived risk of lending money
by the rival and hence constrains the external financial sources necessary for the survival of
the prey.
Regarding the rational predation theories based in different aspects to asymmetric infor-
mation, Fumagalli and Motta (2013) propose a model in which predation prevents the rival
from reaching the scale it needs to operate efficiently.
In the predation models cited above, the rationality of the incumbent is linked with the
profitability of the predatory practice, and hence depends of the existence of a recoupment
phase. In this paper we explore the plausibility of predatory behavior by public firms. Different
from analysis of private firms competition, the rationality of public firms do not necessarily
obeys to the principle of profitability. As the literature of mixed oligopoly has proposed, the
objective function of the public firm might be different of profit maximization and even it can
be the combination of several objectives.
In this paper we explore if predatory pricing by public firms may arise if it weights other
objectives than profit maximization. This approach entails a new perspective of the necessary
conditions for a convincing rational model of predation. First, this approach relaxes the link
between rationality and profitability. Second, as a consequence of this relaxation, the possibility
that a recoupment phase be unnecessary arises.
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3 The Model
In this section we present different models of duopoly in which a private company competes
with a public company whose objective is to maximize bureaucracy. In relation to the duopoly
competition model, Cournot competition and price competition in a framework of differentiated
goods will be explored. On the other hand, we will model the bureaucracy of the public
company in two ways: In the first we will assume that the bureaucracy is proportional to the
company’s income; in the second way, the bureaucracy will be assumed to be proportional to
the quantities sold.
3.1 Public company weighs its sales
Model in which a private company that maximizes profits that is identified with the subscript
1 and a public company that maximizes a weight of sales and profits compete (Freshtman and
Judd, 1987). The weight for profits is α and the weight for sales is (1 − α). Competition a la
Cournot (Quantities). Constant marginal costs: c0 > c1, private enterprise is more cost efficient.
This assumption implicitly reflects the idea that the public company, when trying to maximize
the bureaucracy, creates a production technology that favors the hiring of certain factors of
production and that therefore is below the frontier of efficient production possibilities. Nett
(1994) proposed a mixed duopoly model allowing private and public firms to choose among
various technologies. He argues that the corresponding cost functions can be interpreted as the
consequence of different investment levels in research and development.
The Inverse linear demand function is: p = a − bQ where p is the price and Q the total
quantity, Q = q0 + q1
The objective function of the private company is:
π1 = pq1 − c1q1 = (a − b(q0 + q1))q1 − c1q1
The objective function of the public company:
v0 = α(pq0 − c0q0) + (1 − α)(pq0) = (a − b(q0 + q1))q0 − αc0q0
The best response function of the private company is given by:
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q1(q0) =
a − bq0 − c1
2b
The best response function of the public company is given by:
q0(q1) =
a − bq1 − αc0
2b
The equilibrium quantity of the private firm is given by:
q∗1 =
a − 2c1 + αc0
3b
The equilibrium quantity of the public company is given by:
q∗0 =
a − 2αc0 + c1
3b
The total market quantity is given by:
Q∗ =
2a − c1 − αc0
3b
The equilibrium price is given by:
p∗ =
a + c1 + αc0
3
Corollary 1: In the Cournot duopoly in which the public firm weights the total sales,
the higher the profit maximization weight, the more difficult it is to incur exclusive
predatory pricing.




The condition of exclusive predatory prices depends on the value of the maximum willing-
ness to pay, the parameter a, that the relative value of the costs between the private company
and the public company is not very small and that the weighting of the benefits by the public
company is not very great. When the weighting of sales tends to 1, exclusionary prices are
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incurred.◻
Corollary 2: In the Cournot duopoly in which the public firm weights the total
sales, the higher the profit maximization weight, the greater the difference between
the costs of the private company and the public company, the more the sacrifice by
the public to impose exclusionary prices.
Proof: In the model presented, the marginal costs of public and private firms are constant,
therefore it is always possible to express c1 = βc0, where β =
c1
c0
. Given that private incoming
company is more efficient β < 1.




This entails that the sacrifice by public firm for exclusionary prices to occur is higher if the
inefficiency of the public company is great in relation to the private company.◻
3.2 Public company weighs its production volumes
In this second version of the model, a private company that maximizes profits that is identified
with the subscript 1 competes with a public company that maximizes a weighting of its sales
volumes and its profits. In this second version of the model we also assume competition to the
Cournot (Quantities), constant marginal costs, such that c0 > c1 that is, the private company
is more cost efficient. As in the previous case, we consider an inverse linear demand function:
p = a − bQ where p the price y Q the total quantity, Q = q0 + q1.
As in model 1, the objective function of the private company is:
π1 = pq1 − c1q1 = (a − b(q0 + q1))q1 − c1q1
In this case, the objective function of the public company is expressed as follows:
v0 = α(pq0 − c0q0) + (1 − α)q0 = α((a − b(q0 + q1))q0 − c0q0) + (1 − α)q0
The best response function of the private company is given by:
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q1(q0) =
a − bq0 − c1
2b
The best response function of the public company is given by:
q0(q1) =
γ + a − bq1 − c0
2b
 Where γ =
(1−α)
α
The equilibrium quantity of the private firm is given by:
q∗1 =
a − 2c1 + c0 − γ
3b
The equilibrium quantity of the public company is given by:
q∗0 =
2γ + a − 2αc0 + c1
3b
The total quantity sold in the market is given by:
Q∗ =
2a − c1 − c0 + γ
3b
The equilibrium price is given by:
p∗ =
a + c1 + c0 − γ
3
In this model the condition of exclusionary predatory prices, p∗ < c1, is given by:
γ > a − 2c1 + c0
Corollary 3: In the Cournot duopoly in which the public firm weights the production
scale, the higher the profit maximization weight, the more difficult it is to incur
exclusive predatory pricing.
Proof: In this case, the condition of predation depends on the value of the maximum
willingness to pay, the parameter a, that the relative difference in costs between the private
company and the public company is not very large and that the weighting of the benefits by of
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the public company is not very large (Remember that γ = 0 if the public company maximizes
profits). When the weighting of sales tends to 1, exclusionary prices are incurred. ◻
Corollary 4: In the Cournot duopoly in which the public firm weights the production
scale, the higher the profit maximization weight, the greater the difference between
the costs of the private company and the public company, the more the sacrifice by
the public to impose exclusionary prices.
Proof: In the model presented, the marginal costs are constant, therefore it is always
possible to express c1 = βc0, where β =
c1
c0
. Hence, private companies are more efficient β < 1.
The exclusionary predatory pricing condition, p∗ < c1, is given by:
β >
a + c0 − γ
2c0
This condition implies that the sacrifice by public firm for exclusionary prices to occur
is higher if the new competitor (private) is efficient and if the incumbent (public) is very
inefficient. ◻
3.3 Differentiated goods - Public company weighs its sales
Some of the services provided by public companies are not homogeneous goods. Activities
such as postal or air transport services can be conceived as differentiated goods. For this
reason, this section proposes a Bertrand model with differentiated goods in which a private
company that maximizes profits that is identified with the sub-index 1 and a public company
that maximizes a weighting of its sales and profits. As in the previous case, constant marginal
costs are assumed and that the costs of the private company are lower than those of the public
company, c0 > c1. We model product differentiation using demand functions with a substitution
parameter. Linear inverse demand functions are assumed for both products as follows:
pi(qi, qj) = a − b(qi + θqj)
where pi is the price,qi the quantity sold by the firm i and θ is the substitution parameter.
Therefore, the demand functions of each firm can be expressed as follows:




The objective function of the private company is:
π1 = (p1 − c1)q1 = (p1 − c1)(
a(1 − θ) − p1 + θp0
(1 − θ2)b
)
The objective function of the public company:
V0 = α((p0 − c0)q0) + (1 − α)(p0q0) = (p0 − αc0)(
a(1 − θ) − p0 + θp1
(1 − θ2)b
)
The best response function of the private company is given by:
p1(p0) =
a(1 − θ) + θp0 + c1
2
The best response function of the public company is given by:
p0(p1) =
a(1 − θ) + θp1 + αc0
2
The equilibrium quantity of the private firm is given by:
p∗1 =
a(θ + 2)(1 − θ) + θαc0 + 2c1
4 − θ2
The equilibrium quantity of the public company is given by:
p∗0 =
a(θ + 2)(1 − θ) + θc1 + 2αc0
4 − θ2
Corollary 5: In the Bertrand model with differentiated products duopoly in which
the public firm weights the total sales, the higher the profit maximization weight,
the more difficult it is to incur exclusive predatory pricing.
Proof: In this model, the condition of exclusive predatory prices for the private company,
p∗1 < c1,it is given by:
α <
(2 − θ2)c1 − a(θ + 2)(1 − θ)
θc0
This condition depends on the value of the substitution parameter, that the inefficiency
of the costs of the public company is not very great in relation to the costs of the private
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company and that the weighting of the benefits by the public company is not very big. When
the weighting of sales by public firm tends to 1, exclusionary prices are incurred.◻
Corollary 6: In the Bertrand model with differentiated products duopoly in which
the public firm weights the total sales, the higher the profit maximization weight,
the greater the difference between the costs of the private company and the public
company, the more the sacrifice by the public to impose exclusionary prices.
Proof: If, as in the models exposed above, it is expressed c1 = βc0, where β =
c1
c0
and β < 1,
it is possible to express the condition of exclusionary predatory prices, p∗ < c1, as follows:
β >
a(θ + 2)(1 − θ) + αθc0
(2 − θ2)c0
In this condition, it is possible to observe that the sacrifice by public firm for exclusionary
prices to occur is higher if the cost inefficiency of the public company in relation to the private
company is great. ◻
3.4 Differentiated goods - Public company that weights its production vol-
umes
In this version of the model, a private company that maximizes profits and a public company
that maximizes a weighting of its volumes and profits compete. These companies interact in an
environment of competition à la Bertrand with differentiated goods. As in the previous model,
constant marginal costs are assumed and that the costs of the private company are lower than
those of the public company, c0 > c1 and product differentiation is modeled by using demand
functions with a substitution parameter.
The objective function of the private company is:
π1 = (p1 − c1)q1 = (p1 − c1)(
a(1 − θ) − p1 + θp0
(1 − θ2)b
)
The objective function of the public company:
W0 = α(p0 − c0)q0 + (1 − α)q0 = (α(p0 − c0) + (1 − α))(
a(1 − θ) − p0 + θp1
(1 − θ2)b
)
The best response function of the private company is given by:
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p1(p0) =
a(1 − θ) + θp0 + c1
2
The best response function of the public company is given by:
p0(p1) =





 Where γ =
(1−α)
α
The equilibrium quantity of the private firm is given by:
p∗1 =





The equilibrium quantity of the public company is given by:
p∗0 =





Corollary 7: In the Bertrand model with differentiated products duopoly in which the
public firm weights the production scale, the higher the profit maximization weight,
the more difficult it is to incur exclusive predatory pricing.
Proof: In this model the condition of exclusive predatory prices of the private company,
p∗1 < c1, is given by:
γ >




It is possible to observe that this condition depends on the value of the substitution pa-
rameter, that the cost inefficiency of the public company in relation to the private company is
not very large and that the weighting of the benefits by the public company is not very big.
When the weighting of sales tends to 1, exclusionary prices are incurred. ◻
Corollary 8: In the Bertrand model with differentiated products duopoly in which the
public firm weights the production scale, the higher the profit maximization weight,
the greater the difference between the costs of the private company and the public
company, the more the sacrifice by the public to impose exclusionary prices.
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Proof: If we express the cost of the private firm as c1 = βc0, where β =
c1
c0
and β < 1.
The exclusionary predatory pricing condition, p∗ < c1, is given by:
β >
a(θ + 2)(1 − θ) + θc0 − γθ
(2 − θ2)c0
Therefore, the sacrifice by public firm for exclusionary prices to occur is higher if the new
competitor (private) and the public firm have large differences in efficiency. ◻
4 Conclusions
In this document we have explored the results on the competition of having a public company
that, in addition to maximizing profits, is also interested in maximizing its scale of operation.
The objective of this theoretical exercise was to try to establish whether, given said incentive
scheme, the public company could engage in anti-competitive behavior.
In line with the results of Sappington and Sidek (2003), we have found that the public
company can incur exclusive predatory prices when the weighting of the benefits is low and
when there is no substantial difference between the efficiency of private and public companies.
Given these results, low cost efficiency of public companies can harm competition in en-
vironments in which public companies have incentives to increase the scale of production, for
example, in companies that are used by politicians as instruments of clientelism or in which
the administrators of public companies are under high pressure to provide quasi-free services.
An alternative to solve this dilemma may be the old recipe for privatization. However There
are new lines of research that suggest that in specific sectors, such as the delivery industry,
the introduction of new operators can improve the efficiency of large incumbents. Ennis (2021)
proposes a new definition of natural monopoly in which the incumbent’s cost function may be
interior to the frontier cost function and hence the possibility of total cost reduction by the
entry of new providers (more efficient) arises.
Another option is to implement an incentive mechanism in which government institutions
avoid the temptation to exert pressure on the managers of public companies and offer them
a contract that is compatible in incentives with profit maximization. Unfortunately, in either
case, political parties are required to push for this reform, which is doubtful, knowing that it
will reduce the scope of their tentacles of power.
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